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COERCING COOPERATION FROM 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: 
IDENTITY AND COINCIDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL OBliGATIONS AGAINST 
MONEY lAUNDERING AND HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION 
BENJAMIN R. HARTMAN* 
Abstract: International Hlltlatives concerning the global financial 
system traditionally have been implemented through the building of 
consensus among affected states to identify problems and then set forth 
the means to deal with those problems. Recently, however, under the 
title Actions Against Abuse of the Global Financial System, the G7 nations 
began a campaign that uses the threat of sanctions to coerce 
cooperation from offshore financial centers in the areas of money 
laundering and tax competition. The use of sanctions to force 
compliance is problematic because, although sanctions would be 
available to remedy a violation of an international obligation, there has 
been no attempt to identify any such obligation for the Object States. 
Instead the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in accordance 
with the agenda of the G7, have set forth self-referential criteria that 
assess compliance of the offshore financial centers with presumed 
international "standards" against money laundering and harmful tax 
competition. The legal enforceability of the sanctions threatened for 
non-compliance, however, depends upon the existence of legal bases for 
both sets of criteria. This Article attempts to determine whether such 
bases exist. 
* Bel~amin R. Hartman was graduated from the University of Texas (B.A., 1996; J.D., 
2000) and the University of Edinburgh (LL.M., with distinction, 2000). He is currently an 
associate in the New York office of Salans Hertzfeld & Heilbronn where he concentrates in 
taxation and commercial litigation. He extends his gratitude to Professor Bill Gilmore at 
the University of Edinburgh, whose guidance and expel,tise in the field made this piece 
possible. He also extends his thanks to Professor H.W. Perry at the University of Texas 
without whose inspiration he never would have developed his interest in the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 2000 was hard on many of the classic "offshore" 
financial centers (OFCs); they found themselves in the center of a 
multi-front attack. On May 25th they were labeled "non-cooperative" 
by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in the context of global 
financial stability, then again on June 22nd, "non-cooperative" by the 
FATF in the context of money laundering, and finally, on June 26th, 
''Tax Havens" by the OECD in the context of tax competition. A total 
of nine countries enjoyed the misfortune of being thrice labeled in 
those two months: three in the Caribbean (the Bahamas, St. Kitts-
Nevis, and St. Vincent) and four in the Pacific (Niue, Nauru, and the 
Cook and Marshall Islands) as well as Panama and Liechtenstein. l 
It is no accident that OFCs have found themselves the objects of 
such timely criticisms, but rather it is the manifestation of the efforts 
of the Group of 7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment (G7) , all of which are influential members of the FATF, 
OECD, and FSF. The G7 collects the initiatives of the three organiza-
tions under the title Actions Against Abuse of the Global Financial System 
while it acknowledges the initiatives separately2 under the sub-
headings of Money Laundering, Tax Havens and Other Harmful Tax Prac-
tices, and Offshore Financial Centers.3 The G7 threatens the use of sanc-
tions4 against jurisdictions that "demonstrate failure to meet certain 
standards and are not committed to enhancing their level of compli-
ance with international standards."5 While international initiatives 
concerning the global financial system traditionally have stressed con-
sensus building, the concept of identifying, isolating, and punishing 
countries for non-compliance with international standards has be-
1 All Havens in a Storm, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2000, at 114 [hereinafter AIlHavens]. 
2 The report implicitly divides the issues according to the discreet initiatives, saying 
"Governments must intensifY their co-operation and strengthen international frameworks 
to effectively combat money laundering and harmful tax competition, and to improve the 
observance of international standards and good governance." G7 FINANCE MINISTERS TO 
THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, ACTIONS AGAINST ABUSE OF THE GLOBAL FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM' 2, at http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.goJp/e/documents/action.html (july 
21,2000) [hereinafter ACTIONS AGAINST ABUSE]. 
3 As if to reinforce the conceptual coincidence of the topics, the G7 reintegrates them 
under the last sub-heading, and enumerates many of the key goals from each. Id. " 9, 10. 
This despite the fact that the FSF specifically excludes harmful tax competition from its 
purview. See infra note 19. 
4 The G7 actually uses the term "counter-measures," but to avoid confusion with the 
counter-measures used against money launderers, I will use the term "sanctions" instead. 
5 ACTIONS AGAINST ABUSE, supra note 2" 12. 
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come more common.6 The idea first originated in 1988 in the context 
of money laundering.7 Since then some unilateral examples have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach.s 
The effectiveness of the novel approach of threatening sanctions 
has incited some heavy criticisms from OFCs. The Member States of 
the Caribbean Community have characterized the three initiatives as 
"continued attacks on the Region's offshore sector by the G7," and 
have even gone so far as to describe the FATF, OECD, and FSF as 
"agencies" of the G7.9 The Cayman Islands-which had just hosted a 
separate initiative organized under the UN by the United Nations 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) Global 
Programme on Money LaunderinglO-said it was astonished about 
being included on the FATF list and that "the decision was made 
without due process. "11 These criticisms are not altogether unfair in 
light of the methods that the G 7 and the other three organizations 
have adopted. 
The threat of sanctions is problematic in several ways.12 The most 
significant problem is that while the sanctions are threatened for non-
6 See FATF, REpORT OF THE FATF ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 
8 n 49 et seq., athttp://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/NCCT_en.pdf (Feb. 14,2000). 
7 Bruce Zagaris, Constructing a Hemisphelic Initiative Against Transnational CJime, 19 
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1888, 1891 (1996) (discussing amendments to the US 1988 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act introduced by Senator Kerry). For an analysis of the viability of sanctions against 
countries complicit in money laundering in the context of GATT and GATS, see generally 
Matthew B. Comstock, GATT and GATS: A Public Morals Attack on Money LaundRling, 15 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139 (1994). 
8 All Havens, supra note 1, at 114 (discussing the impact of the US and UK issuing an 
"advisory" to financial institutions recommending enhanced scrutiny of transactions with 
Antigua). 
9 Press Release, 106/2000 CARlCOM Response to G7 Charges, at http://www2.carib-
exporLcom/index.php3?page_id=5023 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
10 "Its objective is to obtain global commitment to internationally accepted standards 
of financial regulation and anti-money laundering measures as they apply to the provision 
of cross border financial services; these standards al'e set out in the UN Offshore Forum 
statement of minimum standards." UNODCCP, UNITED NATIONS OFFSHORE FORUM CAY-
MAN ISLANDS, COMMUNIQUE, at http://www.odccp.org/ document_2000-03-30_1.html 
(Mar. 30-31, 2000). 
II John Burgess, 15 Nations Cited as Havens for Possible Money CJ'imes, WASH. POST, June 
23, 2000, at E3, available at http://washingtonpost.com. 
12 First, they claim that no actual harm was suffered, but rather that there is the poten-
tial for harm. According to US Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat, presence on 
the FATF list, for example, does not mean that a country is a money laundering center-
only that its laws make money laundering possible. Burgess, supra note 11. Similarly, the 
OECD identifies factors that "may potentially cause harm to the tax systems of other coun-
tries as they facilitate both corpOl'ate and individual income tax avoidance and evasion." 
OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 22 'll 50 (1998) [herein-
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compliance with certain "standards, "13 only the vaguest attempt has 
been made to define what those standards might be, and no attempt 
has been made to identify any source of obligation which would re-
quire-as opposed to encourage--compliance. The FATF lists a num-
ber of standards "for instance"14 but does not clearly define what re-
quirements actually are standard in the international context. 
Moreover, the OECD, in a self-referential manner, demands compli-
ance with its own standards but identifies no source, outside itself, 
which would make them obligatory standards.15 
It is the goal of this Article to address these complaints. This Arti-
cle, however, is not concerned with whether the G7 is abusing its dis-
proportionate political power. Neither is it concerned with any politi-
calor moral arguments for or against the current state of the 
international financial system. Consequently, I will offer neither 
apocalyptic nor utopic descriptions of an unregulated international 
financial system. Instead, this Article is an attempt to address the 
OFCs' complaints about the "attack" coordinated against them by the 
G 7 through its agents. 
Necessary to this end is a determination of the legal bases of both 
the initiatives and the standards the G7 attempts to impose, and the 
consequent enforceability of the sanctions threatened for non-
compliance. This attempt begins with an introduction to the three 
initiatives, the organizations relevant to them, the states that those 
after DECO REpORT]. Secondly, the rhetoric generally focuses on money laundering and 
tax evasion, both of which are private criminal acts. The potential harm, therefore, would 
be caused by private actors who are citizens of the potentially injured state and not by the 
states against whom the sanctions are threatened. Any attempt to establish such a breach 
by imputing the acts of criminals upon the Object States must fail prima facie. The crimi-
nals would not be agents of an Object State, and so there is no basis to impute the respon-
sibility for their actions upon that state. INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw COMMISSION REpORT, 1996: DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBIUTY art. 11, at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/chap03.htm#doc38 (last visited Apr. 6, 2001) 
[hereinafter DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBIUTY]. 
13 ACTIONS AGAINST ABUSE, supra note 2, , 12. 
14 FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: IN-
CREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 17 n.5, 
at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/NCCT2000_en.pdf (June 22, 2000) (citing "those [stan-
dards] established by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, the International Association of Insurance Su-
pervisors, the International Accounting Standards Committee and the FATF") (emphasis 
added). 
15 DECO, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REpORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL 
COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 21 
'27, at http://www.oecd.org/ /daf/fa/harm_tax/Report_En.pdf (June 26, 2000) [here-
inafter OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION]. 
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organizations comprise, and the states that are the objects of the ini-
tiatives. In the second part, I attempt to identify the sources of the 
obligations that could bind the OFCs. Finally, the third part of the 
analysis assesses, based upon the obligations established in section 
two, to what extent sanctions would be available to the G7, its "agen-
cies," and their member states against OFCs for non-compliance with 
the goals set by the initiatives. I6 
Although the FSF initiative is included in the first section to 
demonstrate the degree of overlap among the identified states, it is 
excluded from the latter two sections for the following two reasons. 
First, its policies are inherently less suspect than those of the other 
two organizations. The goal of the FSF's initiative is to assess which 
OFCs might have implications for the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF) work on the assessment of financial stability in general, and for 
the joint IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program in 
particular.I7 With 182 member states, the IMF is a much more repre-
sentative body than the FATF and OECD.IS Its policies, which are built 
upon the consensus of those member states, enjoy greater consensus 
within the international community as a whole, and these policies are, 
consequently, less suspect. Second, although the efforts of the G7 to 
tie the three initiatives together have met with some success, the FSF 
has resisted becoming the simple agent of the G7. Unlike the FATF, 
the FSF expressly has dissociated itself from the OECD's initiative by 
specifically excluding the issue of harmful tax competition from its 
agenda. I9 These two factors effectively insulate the FSF initiative from 
much of the criticism born by the other two organizations, especially 
the OECD. Therefore, it is excluded from the analysis below. 
16 I will ignore the legal distinction between the threat of sanctions and the use of 
sanctions because I am here concerned with the ultimate availability of those sanctions. 
17 See MONETARY & EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CEN-
TERS, IMF BACKGROUND PAPER, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/ 
eng/back.htm (June 23, 2000). 
18 The IMF has a total of 182 members-as compared with thirty-one and twenty-nine, 
respectively. IMF, IMF MEMBER'S QUOTAS AND VOTING POWER, AND IMF GOVERNORS n.I, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#total(Dec.II , 2000). 
19 See FSF, REpORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTERS 10 n.7, at 
http://www.fsforum.OI'g/Reports/RepOFC.pdf (Apr. 5, 2000); see also, MONETARY & Ex-
CHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ROLE OF THE 
IMF, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshOl.e/2000/eng/role.htm (June 23, 
2000). 
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I. COINCIDENCE AND IDENTITY 
A. Players 
The states relevant to the inquiry of the existence of legal obliga-
tions can be divided into two groups: those attempting to impose the 
obligations (Subject States), and those against whom the obligations 
are being imposed (Object States). This distinction is made more real 
by the fact that there is no overlap between the membership of the 
two groups. 
1. Subject States 
The members of the G7, the FATF, and the OECD comprise the 
Subject States. The Group of 7, which are members of both organiza-
tions, is central to the initiatives of these two organizations. The G7 
includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States (US). The FATF was convened by the G7 in July 
1989 specifically to address the problem of money laundering and has 
become the primary international forum focusing on combating 
money laundering.2o It has thirty-one members: twenty-nine member 
countries and two international organizations.21 The OECD, on the 
other hand, was formed to provide "governments a setting in which to 
discuss, develop and perfect economic and social policy. "22 There are 
twenty-nine members of the OECD.23 
In addition to the FATF and the OECD, there are other interna-
tional organizations that attempt to deal with the issues here raised. 
20 J. Drage, Countering Money Laundering: The Response of the Financial Sector, in MONEY 
LAUNDERING 60, 65 (Hector L. MacQueen ed., 1993). 
21 The member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The international organizations are the European Commission and the Gulf 
Co-operation Council. 
22 OECD, WHAT IS OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/about/generallindex.htm (last 
modified Feb. 2, 2001). 
23 These include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission of the 
European Communities also takes part in the work of the OECD. See Convention on the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development opened for signature Dec. 14, 
1960, art. 13, 888 U.N.T.S. 180, available at http://www.oecd.org/about/origins/conven-
tion/ conventn.htm. 
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In the area of money laundering, there are several regional efforts to 
deal with the relevant problems: Asian Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) ,24 the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
(CFATF),25 the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on 
the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV Com-
mittee),26 and the Organization of American States (OAS).27 In the 
area of tax competition, there is much less in the way of organizations 
attempting initiatives analogous to the OECD's. The most analogous 
multilateral effort is that initiated by the European Union, the Code 
of Conduct, but this initiative does not address Tax Havens and there-
fore is not relevant. 28 Even though these additional organizations 
might be implementing parallel initiatives, in no instance are they 
implementing the initiatives in question. This factor is important be-
cause their membership comprises many of the Object States. 
2. Objects States 
Despite the differences in the lists and their sources, there still is 
substantial overlap among the countries that are the objects of the 
three lists. The FSF identifies thirty-four states as problematic.29 The 
24 Me'mbers include Australia, Banglade'sh, Chinese' Taipe'i. Fiji. Hong Kong, India. In-
donesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nt"W Zealand, Pakistan, People's Re'public of China. Republic of 
Korea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand. United States, and Vanuatu. 
25 Members include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda. Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados. Be-
lize, Bermuda. British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana. Jamaica, Montse'rrat, Netherland Antilles, Nicaragua. Pan-
ama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turks and Caucus Islands, and Ve'nezuda. 
26 There are twenty-two members including Andorra, Cyprus. Liechtenstein, Malta, 
Russian Federation, and San Marino. 
27 There are thirty-five members including Bahamas, Dominica, Panama, SI. Kitts and 
Nevis, and SI. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
28 See OECD Report, supra note' 12, at 11 , 18. 
29 The' FSF identifies eight as coopel'ative (Dublin, Ire'land; Guernsey; Hong Kong, 
SAR; Isle of Man; Jersey; Luxembourg; Singapore; Switzerland); nine as less cooperative 
(Andorra; Bahrain; Barbados; Bermuda; Gibraltar; Labuan, Malaysia; Macao; SAR; Malta; 
Monaco), and twenty-five as the least cooperative jurisdictions (Anguilla; Antigua and 
Barbuda; Aruba; Bahamas; Belize; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Cook Islands; 
Costa Rica; Cyprus; Lebanon; Liechtenstein; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Nauru; Nether-
lands Antilles; Niue; Panama; Samoa; Se'ychdles; SI. Kitts and Nevis; SI. Lucia; SI. Vincent 
and Grenadines; Turks and Caucus; Vanuatu). This provides a total of thirty-four that 
could be described as uncooperative. See MONETARY & EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, 
IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ROLE OF THE IMF, supra note 19, tbl. 2. 
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FATF identifies fifteen states as non-cooperative.30 It also indicates 
that five of the jurisdictions examined but not included on the list 
have introduced relevant legislation since 1999.31 Without this late 
compliance, it is possible that these five might have been included on 
the list. The OECD list identifies thirty-five tax haven countries.32 An-
other six were left off the list because they made a "full commitment 
to eliminate harmful tax practices by the end of 2005. "33 Technically 
the OECD does not intend the List of Tax Haven Jurisdictions to be a 
basis for sanctions;34 ultimately, the OECD plans to publish a List of 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. The List of Tax Havens Jurisdictions, 
however, still is useful for two reasons: (l) the OECD acknowledges 
that members are free to use the list as a basis for unilateral sanc-
tions;35 and (2) it is strongly predictive of the ultimate list because any 
jurisdiction on it that, by July 31, 2001, has not made a commitment 
to eliminating harmful tax practices "would automatically be included 
in the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens."36 In addition, even those 
that do commit, including the six that have committed already, but 
that do not meet the deadlines set by the OECD or that fail to fulfill 
their commitment in good faith would be placed back on the list of 
uncooperative co un tries. 37 
The coincidence of Object States identified by the three lists is 
strong. Of the fifteen FATF non-cooperative, only three do not appear 
on one of the other lists: Israel, the Philippines, and Russia; that is to 
30 The Bahamas, Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, the Grenadines, Israel, 
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, the Philippines, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent. 
3l Antigua and Barbuda, Guernsey, Mauritius, and Samoa. See FATF, REVIEW TO IDEN-
TIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EF-
FECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra note 14, 'lI'I11, 29, 41, & 56. 
See also All Havens, supra note 1, at 114 (explaining 'The government [of Antigua) soon 
tightened its laws, thus avoiding inclusion on last month's FATF list (though it was on the 
othel" two).") . 
32 SeeOECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 15, at 17. 
33 Id. at 17 'lI 17; see also, OECD, SIX JURISDICTIONS JOIN OECD MEMBERS IN COMMIT-
TING TO ELIMINATE HARMFUL 1AX PRACTICES, at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/ 
nw00-62a.htm (June 19, 2000). 
34 OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 15, at 17,. 17. 
35 The OECD "invites Member countries to refrain from using the names of jurisdic-
tions in paragraph 17 to identify jurisdictions against which new or enhanced defensive 
measures should be applied, but rather to use the List of Uncooperative jurisdictions for 
this purpose. The Forum recognizes that Member countries retain the right to apply, or 
not apply, defensive measures unilaterally to any jurisdiction." Id. at 26 'lI 38. 
36 Id. at 18'1 19. 
37 Id. at 19 'I 22. 
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say that 80% of the states that are threatened with sanctions by the 
FATF are also threatened by either the OECD or the FSF. And as 
stated above, there are nine countries that have been identified on all 
three lists. 38 
These nine can represent a sample of Object States since they all 
can be used to assess to what extent the standards can be imposed by 
both initiatives upon Object States. Since I am here interested in only 
the OECD and FATF initiatives, I add to this sample Dominica, which 
was not on the FSF list, but was on the other two. Additionally, I in-
clude the Cayman Islands in the sample because it was on the FATF 
list of non-cooperative countries (NCC List), and would have been on 
the Tax Haven List had it not made an advanced commitment to im-
plement the OECD's standards.39 In total there are eleven Sample Ob-
ject States to which I generally will limit my analysis-the Bahamas, 
the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, the Marshall Islands, 
Niue, Nauru, Panama, Liechtenstein St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. 
B. Initiatives 
Even though both the FATF NCC List and the OECD List of Tax 
Haven Countries, have been identified by the G7 as Actions Against 
Abuse of the Global Financial System, and they both share the same or 
substantially overlapping Subject and Object States, they are separate 
in their legal inception and development. The discreet nature of the 
initiatives must be followed rigorously in order to distinguish between 
political rhetoric and legal obligations. While political goals and obli-
gations can be relatively malleable, legal obligations are necessarily 
more rigid and, therefore, more difficult to form or to change. 
1. FATF: Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories 
OnJune 22, 2000, the FATF published its Review to Identify Non-
Cooperative Countries or Territories, which contained the above 
mentioned list of non-cooperative OFCs.40 The countries that were 
determined to be non-cooperative were found so based upon the 
38 The Bahamas, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, Niue, Nauru, Panama, Liecll-
tenstein St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
39 See supra note 29. 
40 FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: IN-
CREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra 
note 14. 
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twenty-five criteria (25 Criteria) promulgated by the FATF in its Re-
port on Non-cooperative Countries and Territories. These criteria 
were set forth "to identify detrimental rules and practice which im-
pede international co-operation in the fight against money launder-
ing."41 The criteria are said to be "consistent with the FATF Forty Rec-
ommendations. "42 The Forty Recommendations were first 
promulgated by the FATF in 1990 and then revised in 1996 to take 
into account the lessons of six years of experience.43 These recom-
mendations are said to "have been established as the international 
standard for effective anti-money laundering measures."44 Moreover, 
the Forty Recommendations are built upon the foundations laid by 
the 1988 UN convention, the Basle Committee on Banking Regula-
tions and Supervisory Practices,45 and make reference to the stan-
dards promulgated by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
the International Accounting Standards Committee.46 
The 25 Criteria are subdivided into four categories: (1) loopholes 
in financial regulations; (2) impediments set by other regulatory re-
quirements; (3) obstacles to international cooperation; and (4) in-
adequate resources for preventing, detecting and repressing money 
laundering activities.47 
2. OECD: Report on Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices 
OnJune 26, 2000, the OECD published its Report on Progress in 
Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices,48 which provided 
the names of the Tax Havens listed above. This report represents the 
41 Id. at 1 'I 5. 
42 Id. 
43 FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS 2'1[ 3, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs_ 
en.htm (june 28,1996). 
44 FATF, REvIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES: IN-
CREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra 
note 14, at 1 , l. 
45 WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
COUNTERMEASURES 80 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter DIRTY MONEY 1; see also Drage, supra 
note 20, at 64-65. 
46 FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: IN-
CREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra 
note 14, at 17 n.5. 
47 FATF, REpORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, 
Annex. 
48 OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 15. 
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first step in the work of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. The Fo-
rum was created under the mandate of the 1998 OECD49 as a subsidi-
ary body of the Committee on Fiscal Mfairs (CFA) .50 The CFA ''was 
established in 1971 to provide a forum for senior tax policy-makers 
and administrators from OECD Member countries and non-OECD 
countries to discuss international and domestic tax issues. "51 The Fo-
rum is "responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Guide-
lines and Recommendations set out" in the OECD Report on Harm-
ful Tax Competition.52 The OECD Report was prepared, under the 
joint Chairmanship of France and Japan, by the "Special Sessions on 
Tax Competition" in response to the Ministerial Communique of May 
1996 that called upon the OECD to "[d]evelop measures to counter 
the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on investment and 
financing decisions and the consequences for national tax bases. "53 
The Special Sessions was created by the Committee on Fiscal Mfairs 
specifically to address this request.54 The Harmful Tax Competition 
Report identified four criteria: (1) no or only nominal taxes; (2) lack 
of transparency; (3) no substantial activities; and (4) lack of effective 
exchange of information. 
3. The Ultimatum: Compliance or Sanctions 
Both the OECD and the FATF conceive of using coercive action 
to gain cooperation from OFCs. The OECD in its 2000 Report lists 
numerous measures, such as termination of treaties, to be taken 
against OFCs which refuse to comply.55 The Report also suggests that 
"non-tax measures" should be considered. 56 The FATF speaks of re-
stricting or even prohibiting financial transactions with non-
cooperative jurisdictions, "as an ultimate recourse should a country or 
territory have decided to preserve laws or practices that are particu-
larly damaging for the fight against money laundering. "57 The fact 
49 OECD Report, supra note 12, at 53,142. 
50 Id. at 7, l. 
51 OECD, NEW CHAIR OF THE OECD's COMMITTEE FOR FISCAL AFFAIRS, at 
http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-07a.htm (Jan. 27, 2000). 
52 OECD Report, supra note 12, at 54, 145. 
53 Id. at 71[ l. 
54 Id. at 7'J[ 3. 
55 OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 15, at 251[ 35. 
56 Id. at 26, 36. 
57 FATF, REpORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 
8,54 (emphasis added). 
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that sanctions are an ultimate threat should not obscure the fact that 
they are still a threat. 
These measures clearly can be harmful to OFCs. The Economist 
notes that "[e]ven mild measures can have surprising bite. Last year, 
Antigua suffered a financial drought after America and Britain issued 
an 'advisory' to their financial institutions, recommending 'enhanced 
scrutiny' for transactions there."58 But more extreme measures also 
are being considered; for example, France has indicated that it could 
be ready to "cease all financial relations of whatever type" with offend-
ing countries.59 If an advisory can cause a financial drought then an 
absolute prohibition on financial transactions with an OFC would be 
devastating. 
Several of the measures suggested potentially would constitute 
violations by the Subject States of their obligations toward OFCs un-
der international law. For example, the implementation of trade ob-
stacles, such as barring the provision of cross-border financial services 
as the FATF suggests, could violate obligations to the WTO.60 Unilat-
eral termination of a treaty, as the OECD suggests, also could consti-
tute a breach under Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (Vienna Convention).61 Although there is no certainty that 
these measures would be illegal, the potential for illegality identifies, 
in this context, the obligations that Subject States owe to Object 
States.62 
The potential wrongfulness of a breach of the Subject States' ob-
ligations, however, would be obviated if the measures were taken to 
remedy a prior breach by the Object States. As Article 30 of the Inter-
national Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibil-
58 All Havens, supra note 1, at 114; CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2000, at 19 (describing 
the proportion of Antigua's economy that is composed of financial services), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
59 All Havens, supra note 1, 114 (citing French finance minister Laurent Fabius). 
60 See generally Comstock, supra note 7, at 166-73. Although Comstock argues that tar-
iffs should be used against states that refuse to become parties to international money 
laundering agreements, he acknowledges that such tariffs ultimately could be found to 
violate trade obligations under GATT and GATS. [d. at 172. 
61 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm. 
62 It is unnecessary to determine to what extent the suggested measures constitute 
breaches under international law and, furthermore, it is not the goal of this Article to ana-
lyze to what extent the various acts threatened by the OECD and FATF would constitute 
illegal sanctions under international law. Rather, the goal is to assess the availability of 
sanctions under international law to OECD and FATF member states. If sanctions are not 
available, then a further analysis of which of the acts constitute sanctions would be neces-
sary. That inquiry exceeds the scope of this Article. 
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ity states, "The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity 
with an obligation of that State towards another State is precluded if 
the act constitutes a measure legitimate under international law 
against that other state, in consequence of an internationally wrongful 
act of that other State. "63 This statement would make the suggested 
measures legal to the extent that they are a legitimate response to a 
prior breach by the Object States. 
C. Brief Consideration of Obligations: Incurrence, Breach, and Sanctions 
1. Preliminary Considerations 
Although much of the rhetoric surrounding these initiatives re-
lies upon the criminal element of the relevant acts, this is inadequate 
as a legal basis upon which to rest these initiatives. Both initiatives 
threaten sanctions for the refusal to remedy the potential for harm, not 
actual harm.64 Some parties, such as UNODCCP, say that inherent in 
the concept of a state's sovereignty is the principle that no other state 
"should assist citizens or residents of another State in the violation of 
the laws of their home country. "65 However, even if we accept the 
principle that State A is injured by State B when B allows A's citizens 
to break A's laws, the obligation that would come therefrom would be 
that B must not allow A's citizens to break A's laws. It does not implic-
itly follow that B would be obliged to remove even the potential for 
A's citizens to break A's laws as both the FATF and OECD initiatives 
require. Furthermore, some of the obligations the OECD attempts to 
impose have no connection with criminal acts. The OECD includes 
low taxes along with tax evasion under its concern about erosion of 
tax base. There is, however, no necessary connection between low 
taxes and tax evasion. There is, therefore, no basis to claim that offer-
ing low taxes facilitates tax crimes. For sanctions to be available to 
Subject States, therefore, the breaching Object States must be bound 
under an obligation from some other source to comply with the crite-
ria of the OECD and FATF. 
63 DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 12. It should be noted that 
the article is titled Countermeasures in Respect of an Internationally Wmngful Act, but to avoid 
confusing the concepts contained therein with that of counter-measures against money 
laundering, I will use the term "sanction" to describe the coercive measures taken by Sub-
ject States against Object States. Id. 
64 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
65 UNODCCP, FINANCIAL HAVENS, BANKING SECRECY AND MONEy-LAUNDERING 59 
(1998). 
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2. Sources of Obligation 
These potential sources of obligations can be divided into three 
categories: (1) Consent, (2) Coincidence, and (3) Consensus. Con-
sent and Consensus 66 correspond with the traditional divisions of 
sources of law under treaties and customs as they are identified in Ar-
ticle 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(I. CJ.) .67 Coincidence refers to the possibility that obligations under 
parallel instruments might exist or that behavior of the Object States 
might estop them from complaining. 
To be enforceable, the 25 Criteria either can define the legal ob-
ligations themselves or simply assess compliance with other legal obli-
gations.68 If, and to the extent that, they define the legal obligations-
which would be possible if the 25 Criteria themselves are legally bind-
ing-then they are enforceable. However, if they simply assess compli-
ance with other legal obligations, then they are enforceable only to 
the extent that they parallel those other actual obligations. 
It should be noted, though, that while "there is a wide range of 
views on the basis of obligation-natural law, consent, principles ante-
rior to the legal system itself, consensus, reciprocity-it is interesting 
that they all exclude imposed obligation by the enforcement of sanc-
tions. "69 This fact reinforces the principle that, to the extent that the 
measures constitute sanctions absent some breach of a prior obliga-
tion, the unilateral, or even multilateral, imposition of sanctions does 
not create a legal basis for compliance. 
The category of Consent embodies the traditional concept that a 
state can agree to create obligations to another state. An international 
agreement is "an agreement between two or more states or interna-
tional organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is gov-
erned by internationallaw."70 Such an agreement creates obligations 
66 These terms are loosely borrowed from Rosalyn Higgins. Consensus actually could 
be broader than custom so far as to include general principles, but this Article limits the 
analysis to custom. See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw AND How WE USE IT 16 (1999). 
67 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, at 
http://www.icj-<:ij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2001). 
68 Strictly speaking, in the latter case, the 25 Criteria would not be enforceable except 
by derivation from otller enforceable obligations. 
69 HIGGINS, supra note 66, at 16. 
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 301(1) (1986) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. There are a number of names for international 
agreements but the most common are treaties and conventions. See id. at cmt. a. 
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binding between the parties under international law.71 An agreement 
enters into force once the parties have expressed their consent to be 
bound.72 A state's consent to be bound by an international agreement 
may be expressed in a number of ways including signature, exchange 
of instruments, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession, or by any 
other means agreed upon.73 But absent such consent, there exists no 
agreement and, therefore, a state would not be bound. 
Coincidence74 can be divided into two sub-categories, obligations 
incurred either through: (l) parallel agreements or (2) through uni-
lateral declarations. Subject States could argue that Object States, 
which have expressed an intent-even if in some other forum-to 
perform in a manner that parallels the expectations contained in one 
of the respective initiatives, would be estopped from claiming free-
dom from compliance with that parallel obligation. 
The general rule is that international agreements do not create 
obligations to third party states.75 Thus, when a state consents to obli-
gations under an agreement, that state is not obligated to states which 
were not parties to that agreement. However, where Object States 
have consented to obligations to Subject States, which parallel those 
demanded by Subject States under another initiative, the OFCs have 
no basis to complain that there are third party states.76 
Furthermore, even where there is no parallel obligation to Sub-
ject States, Subject States might constructively enjoy rights where the 
OFCs have made unilateral declarations that demonstrate an inten-
tion to perform in accordance with principles the Subject States are 
attempting to enforce. As the I.CJ. has expressed: 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilat-
eral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the 
effect of creating legal obligations .... When it is the inten-
tion of the State making the declaration that it should be-
come bound according to its terms, that intention confers 
on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the 
71 [d. § 102 cmt. g. 
72 [d. § 312(1). 
73 [d. § 312 cmf. c; but see id. at cmt. d (describing how ratification subsequent to signa-
ture or accession is more common means of expressing consent). 
74 Coincidence is actually just a re-categorization of some traditional sources. 
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 61, art. 34; see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 70, § 324(1). 
76 That is true so far as the DECO or FATF member state which is invoking sanctions is 
privy to the parallel instrument. 
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State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of 
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of 
this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, 
even though not made within the context of international 
negotiations, is binding.77 
While a unilateral statement is not an agreement, it may have legal 
consequences or may become a source of rights and obligations on 
principles analogous to estoppel. 78 The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
prevents a party from asserting a position in legal proceedings that is 
contrary to the position previously taken by him in the same or some 
earlier legal proceeding.79 The I.CJ found that such an analogous 
principle bound France by its various public statements that demon-
strated an intent to cease atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons.80 This 
Article refers to such obligations as estoppel obligations. 
As with Consent, however, the intent of Object States to be 
bound legally is essential to Coincidence. Agreements or declarations 
made by states are "in many cases bereft of legal (though not politi-
cal) significance, as the states may regard it a policy manoeuvre and 
not as setting up juridical relations between themselves. "81 Agree-
ments and declarations of this sort are sometimes described as "soft 
law. "82 It is important to note, however, that such "soft law" is not le-
gally binding.83 
While both Consent and Coincidence rely upon the intent of the 
Object State to be bound, Consensus can produce obligations for 
States which have not expressed any such intent.84 Customary Interna-
tional Law is the principle means through which states are legally 
bound absent consent.85 The two elements necessary to demonstrate 
the existence of a norm in customary international law are state prac-
77 Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267, , 43. 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 70, § 301, cmt. Co 
79 United States. v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993). 
80 Nuclear Tests Case, 1974 I.CJ. at 269-70, '151. 
81 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 634 (4th ed. 1997). 
82 See Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial Enforce-
ment Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 
879 (1993). 
83 DJ. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 65 n.l (4th ed. 1991). 
84 See HIGGINS, supra note 66, at 16 
85 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1). General principles are 
typically limited to procedural concepts. See also HARRIS, supra note 83. 
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tice and opinio juriS.86 As the I.C]. expressed it in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Case: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled prac-
tice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a 
way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is ren-
dered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjec-
tive element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris 
sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that 
they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.87 
The Court goes on to explain that state practice including "that of 
States whose interests are specially affected, " should have been both exten-
sive and virtually uniform.88 
State practice can be manifested in many ways including what 
states do in or through international organizations,89 or their partici-
pation in international agreements. Express statements by participat-
ing states are not necessary to demonstrate opinio juris; rather, it can 
be inferred from acts or omissions.90 Although custom can be built on 
acquiescence, broad dissent from a practice should preclude that 
practice from becoming custom. Furthermore, even where dissent 
does not bar the development of a custom, "a state that indicates its 
dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of develop-
ment is not bound by that rule even after it matures. "91 
III. Obligations and Their Sources 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
It is important to note that there is substantial overlap between 
the evidence of the sources of obligations. For example, the potential 
distinctions between the sources are blurred by the fact that state 
86 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C]. 4, 43-
44 " 74-78. For consideration of the circularity of this requirement, see HIGGINS, supra 
note 66, at 18-19; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), sujJra note 70, § 102, Reporter's Note 2. 
87 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 19691.C]. at 44, 77. 
88 See id. at 421 73 (emphasis added). The fact that the interests of the Object States 
are specifically effected is obvious. Their own practices as manifest by their domestic and 
international acts are, therefore, critical to the expansion of any rule of custom. 
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 70, § 102, Reporter's Note 2. 
90Id. § 102 Clnt. C. 
91 Id. § 102 nnt. d. (citing Norwegian Fisheries Case). 
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practice includes the practice of the most interested states in order to 
form a new customary law. Because state practice can be manifest in 
the treaty obligations, there would be substantial overlap between the 
international agreements of the Object States and the customs which 
the state practice of those states supports. 
Furthermore, despite the differences in the sources of obliga-
tions, all three of the sources depend upon the presence of a subjec-
tive element. Both Consent and Coincidence (including both parallel 
obligations and unilateral declarations) require that the Object State 
intended to bind itself by the obligation.92 Consensus, on the other 
hand, requires that the state practice manifest a belief that there is an 
obligation to act so, i.e. opinio juriS.93 Therefore, although the first two 
demand an intent to create obligations and the third a recognition of 
obligations already existing, regardless of which is the source of an 
obligation, the absence of the required subjective element precludes 
the existence of that obligation. 
The categorization of evidence might, consequently, be some-
what arbitrary, but a more thorough presentation would be redun-
dant. The evidence of participation in conventional law therefore will 
be presented once either under the heading of Consent or Coinci-
dence, and evidence of state practice outside multinational acts will 
be presented under the heading of Consensus with only brief men-
tion of evidence offered by international agreements. 
Regardless of these overlaps, in order for the Subject States to 
have sanctions available, it is absolutely essential that they be able to 
demonstrate an independent source, whether Consent, Consensus, or 
Coincidence, of the obligation for OFCs to comply with either the 
FATF's 25 Criteria or the OECD's 4 Criteria. 
B. 25 Criteria 
1. Consent 
Since there is no evidence that OFCs have consented directly to 
the 25 Criteria, there is no basis for the Subject States to claim that 
the Object States have agreed to be bound by that criteria.94 None of 
92 See supra section C on Brief Consideration of Obligations: Incurrence, Breach, and 
Sanctions. 
93 See id. 
94 It could be argued that consent could be demonstrated indirectly by the acceptance 
of the Forty, but this argument will be reserved for the topic of Coincidence. 
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the OFCs identified have representation in the FATF.95 In fact, the 
Caribbean Community has specifically criticized the implementation 
of these criteria based on the fact that they were set unilaterally by 
FATF members, and Caribbean OFCs had no input into their crea-
tion.96 The lack of consent to assessment by the FATF according to the 
25 Criteria also can be implied by the fact that Object States have con-
sented to an alternate mechanism to assess compliance with the goal 
of preventing money laundering, namely mutual evaluation.97 Exter-
nal review by the FATF is a means of evaluation previously not consid-
ered by the Object States. Absent any evidence of consent, there is no 
basis to claim that OFCs have agreed to be bound by the 25 Criteria. 
2. Coincidence 
A stronger argument can be made for requiring compliance with 
the 25 Criteria under coinciding legal obligations created either 
through parallel obligations or unilateral declarations. Parallel obliga-
tions between the Subject and Object States can derive from a num-
ber of sources. The most relevant ones include the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (UN Convention), the Model Regulations Concerning 
Laundering Offences Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Other 
Serious Offenses promulgated by the OAS (OAS Model Regulations), 
the Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering, Search and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, and membership in the 
Egmont Group.98 Unilateral declarations include the statements of 
states in regional bodies that demonstrate their intent to be bound by 
the Forty Recommendations99 and the Nineteen Recommendations of 
the CFATF. 
95 Sw supra note 25. 
96 Press Release. lOG/2000 CARICOM Response to G7 Charges, sujna note 9. 
97 See CFATF, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, at hllp:/ /www.cfatf.org/eng/memo 
(Oct. 10, 199G); see almAPG, SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIA/PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY LAUN-
DERING, FACTSHEET, at http://''''ww.oecd.org./fatf/pdf/ APGFact-2000_en.pdf (May 2000). 
98 FATF, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING INITIATIVES, at 
http://www.oecd.org./fatf/Initiatives_en.htm (last modified Sept. 5, 2000). The EGMONT 
GI'OUp is not a binding body. It is intl'Oduced in this section for the sake of coherence. 
Furthermore, although the FATF mentions the Basle Committee, it is here included be-
cause its membership does not include any Object States. 
99 Arguably, the Forty Recommendations could fit under parallel obligations, but be-
cause of the fact that there is no privity between Subject and Object States, it is more ap-
pl'Opriate to consider them under Uniwteral Declarations. 
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a. Parallel Obligations 
The UN Convention is the fundamental source of obligations in 
the area of money laundering,loo Coming into force in 1990, this con-
vention represents the first global attempt to provide the law en-
forcement community with the necessary tools to undermine the 
financial power of the cartels and other groups in a manner sensitive 
to the requirements of international cooperation. lOl Although the 25 
Criteria do not expressly invoke the UN Convention, Recommenda-
tions 1, 4, 5, and 7 do. As of March 1, 2001, there were 158 member 
states to the convention.102 Six of the NCCs are not signatories to the 
UN Convention: the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Liechtenstein, 
the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Niue. The remaining nine all are 
bound by the UN Convention. 
Many of the eleven Sample Object States also are bound under 
regional agreements. In 1990, the Council of Europe drafted the 
Convention on Laundering, Search and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime,103 Only Liechtenstein has signed, although not ratified, 
this treaty.104 The OAS promulgated its Model Regulations Concern-
ing Laundering Offences in 1992 which were in conformity with the 
1988 UN Convention.105 Of the eleven Sample Object States, the Ba-
hamas, Dominica, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines are members of the OAS. 
The Egmont Group, on the other hand, only includes one of the 
Sample Object States. The purpose of the Egmont Group, with fifty-
three members,106 is to foster international cooperation against 
100 See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1696 U.N.T.S. 449, available at 
http://\Vww.incb.org/ e/ conv /1988/index.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). 
101 DIRTY MONEY, supra note 45, at 51. 
102 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, MONTHLY 
STATUS OF TREATY ADHERENCE, at http://www.odccp.org/document_1999-11-03_1.html 
(Mar. 1,2001). 
103 Convention on Laundering, Search, SeizllI'e and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime, Council of Europe, opened for signature Aug. 11, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141 (entered 
into force Jan. 9, 1990), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 
141.htm. 
104 See Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime, Aug. 8, 1990, at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2001). I will presume, for the sake of argument, that Liechtenstein 
would be bound by estoppel if not legally bound. 
105 DIRTY MONEY, supra note 45, at 188. 
106 FATF, THE EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, at http://www. 
oecd.org./fatf/Ctry-{}rgpages/org-egmont_en.htm (last modified Aug. 17, 2000). 
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money-laundering through Financial Intelligence Units (FlUs). 
Among the states with operational FlUs are seven of the jurisdictions 
considered by the FATF in its June Report. Of these, only Panama was 
identified as non-cooperative. I07 
b. Unilateral Declarations 
In addition to the parallel obligations mentioned above, unilat-
eral declarations can bind the Object States through estoppel. The 
most obvious source of estoppel obligations are those statements of 
states in regional bodies, which demonstrate their intent to be bound 
by the Forty Recommendations. The various regional anti-money 
laundering organizations-the APG, CFATF, and the Eastern and 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)-and 
the Council of Europe all have indicated support in varying degrees 
for the Forty Recommendations. 
The use of these statements to identify an intent to be bound, 
however, has several obstacles. First, the Forty Recommendations were 
not promulgated as binding obligations. Second, although the re-
gional organizations generally demonstrate a desire to promote these 
policies, this desire does not manifest itself as an intent to be bound. 
Third, because the endorsement by the Object States of the Forty 
Recommendations preceded the promulgation of the 25 Criteria, it 
cannot operate as an endorsement of the 25 Criteria. Finally, since the 
Object States have expressly consented to mutual evaluations as a 
means to assess compliance, there is minimal basis to argue that they 
intended to consent to evaluation by the FATF.108 
The Forty Recommendations were not promulgated as binding 
obligations, and therefore, it is difficult to argue that states endorsing 
them demonstrate an intent to be bound by them. As Professor Wil-
liam Gilmore explains, "the 1990 report admits 'the minimal standard 
we recommend can be viewed as rather ambitious'. It should also be 
stressed that, following normal international practice, these recom-
mendations have no binding force as a matter of international law; 
customary or conventional."I09 The FATF is not a permanent interna-
107 See generally FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATI\'E COUNTRIES OR TERRITO-
RIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEAS-
URES, supra note 14 (identirying Panama, Monaco, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Cyprus, British 
Virgin Islands, and Bermuda). 
108 Since this argument is simply a reformation of that made above under Consent, I 
will not reiterate it. 
109 DIRTY MONEY, supra note 45, at 84. 
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tional organization nor is it a body managing a legally binding con-
vention.no Inherent in the title "The Forty Recommendations" is the 
concept that the goals therein are recommended, not obligatory. The 
FATF, when describing the Forty Recommendations, confirms this. 
The FATF website explicitly says that the Recommendations are "not a 
binding international convention,"lll and that the commitment of its 
members to them is "a firm political commitment,"112 not a legal 
commitment. 
Furthermore, while the regional anti-money laundering bodies 
generally demonstrate a desire to implement the policies contained in 
the Forty Recommendations, they do not express an intent to bind 
themselves. In the instances that Object States have expressed support 
of the Recommendations, they demonstrate the lack of the subjective 
element on two levels: (1) states have expressed no intent to be 
bound; and (2) they feel no obligation exists outside their consent. 
Even as late as 1998, the APG, when expressing support for the Forty 
Recommendations, set forth the goal of encouragingl13 their adop-
tion by the member states while recognizing that "[ e] ach jurisdiction 
[would] decide on the particular steps it [would] take to combat 
money laundering. "114 The Council of Europe similarly demonstrates 
support without expressing intent to be bound.115 
The CFATF, on the other hand, has expressed an intent to be 
bound by both the Forty Recommendations and their own Nineteen 
Recommendations. In order to formalize its members' efforts against 
money laundering, the CFATF adopted the Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU).116 According to the MOU, "[m]embers agree to en-
dorse and implement the [Forty FATF and the Nineteen CFATF] 
Recommendations [and] fulfil the obligations expressed in the King-
llD Id. at 82 (quoting remarks made by the Head of Financial Affairs Division of the 
DECD). 
1JJ FATF, MORE ABOUT THE FATF AND ITs WORK, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/About-
FATF _en.htm (last modified Nov. 21, 2000). 
ll2 FATF, BASIC FACTS ABOUT MONEY LAUNDERING: WHAT ARE THE FORTY RECOM-
MENDATIONS, at http://www.oecd.org./fatf/MLaundering_en.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 
2000). 
113 APG, THE 1998 TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE AsIA/PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY 
LAUNDERING, (Mar. 10-12, 1998) reprinted in DIRTY MONEY, supra note 45, app. IX at 338. 
114 [d. at 339. 
ll5 Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Meas-
ures, at http://www.cm.coe.int/dec/1997/600/x17.hun (Sept. 9-10, 1997). 
ll6 DIRTY MONEY, supra note 45, at 187. 
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ston Declaration. "ll7 While this might define both the Forty and the 
Nineteen as obligatory for the CFATF members, the fact that the 
CFATF felt the need to formalize its commitment reinforces the ar-
gument that their is no obligation to the Forty Recommendations 
outside consent. 
Regardless of acceptance of the Forty Recommendations, the en-
dorsement by the Object States preceded the promulgation of the 25 
Criteria; therefore, it cannot operate as an endorsement of the 25 Cri-
teria. In 1992, the CFATF members, by virtue of Article 5 of the King-
ston Declaration on Money Laundering, agreed to endorse and im-
plement the Forty Recommendations. llB This commitment was 
reasserted in the 1996 MOU,l19 Similarly, the APG expressed an intent 
to "[e]ncourage the adoption" of the Forty Recommendations in 
1998;120 it has not reaffirmed its commitment since the promulgation 
of the 25 Criteria. The Council of Europe expressed its endorsement 
in 1997.121 The Cook and the Marshall Islands are Sample States not 
included in any of these organizations, and thus not party to any po-
tentially binding unilateral declaration. 122 
3. Consensus 
In order to establish that the NCCs are bound by consensus, the 
Subject States must be able to show a settled state practice-including 
at least some of the Object States-which evidences a belief by the 
actors that the practice is obligatory. Ironically, the best way to assess 
iii CFATF, MEMORANDUM m' UNDERSTANDING, Art. 1., at http://www.cfatf.org/eng/ 
memo (Oct. 10, 1996). 
118 CFATF, KINGSTON DECLARATION ON MONEY LAUNDERING, at http://www.cfatf.org/ 
eng (Nov. 5-6, 1992). 
119 CFATF, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 117. However, in July 2000, 
the Caribbean Community, whose membership largely overlaps with the CFATF, did reas-
sert its commitment to fighting money laundering even though this reassertion lacks the 
legal nature of the Memorandum. See Press Release, C'ARICOM, Communique Issued On 
The Conclusion of the 21st Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (July 6,2000), at http://www.caricom.org/pres91_00. 
hun. 
120 APG, MONEY LAUNDERING: THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE 13, at 
http://www.oecd.org./fatf/pdf! APGBack-1998_en.pdf (May 1998) (first, identifYing the 
Forty Recommendations as "an international standard for anti-money laundering meas-
ures"; then defining one of its purposes as to "[elncourage the adoption, throughout the 
region, of international anti-money laundering standards."). 
121 Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Meas-
ures, supra note 115. 
122 Israel and Lebanon are also NCCs that arc not members of any of these organiza-
tions but are outside the sample. 
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state practice of the Object States is to simply look to the countries 
which have been identified as non-cooperative.123 
The idea that the 25 Criteria are directly part of customary law 
can be readily dismissed. They were promulgated by an organization 
whose membership includes only twenty-nine states and were de-
signed for application only against non-members. Of the twenty-eight 
countries considered by the report, fifteen were found to be non-
cooperative. That means that over half of the interested object states 
do not manifest state practice in accord with the 25 Criteria. Unlike 
the Forty Recommendations, the 25 Criteria were not endorsed by 
other organizations. In fact, as mentioned above, the Caribbean 
Community has dissented from the application of the 25 Criteria.124 
Four of the countries identified by the FATF as non-cooperative are 
members of the Caribbean Community: the Bahamas, Dominica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Another three 
countries considered in the June report are also members: Antigua 
and Barbuda, Belize, and St. Lucia. Furthermore, the Cayman Islands, 
which is an observer in the organization, was identified as non-
cooperative; and the British Virgin Islands, which is an associated 
member, and Bermuda, which is an observer, were also considered in 
the report. 
The Caribbean Community's dissent operates to frustrate the 
general acceptance of the 25 Criteria as customary law on two levels. 
First, it demonstrates a lack of the consensus that is necessary to form 
a new customary norm. Second, even if a new norm has evolved, it 
establishes that these countries are dissenting from the development 
of that norm. Such an objection should preclude the application of a 
new norm to the dissenters.125 While there is substantial state practice 
that is consistent with the goals set forth within the 25 Criteria, it is 
difficult to argue that these efforts demonstrate acceptance of the 25 
Criteria since the vast majority of the efforts were implemented before 
the promulgation of the 25 Criteria. 
While the 25 Criteria arguably could be deemed a codification of 
custom, a more viable argument is that the Forty Recommendations 
123 The simple fact that the FATF identifies only fifteen countries while the OECD 
identifies forty-two goes a long way to demonstrate the relative breadth of state practice in 
the two initiatives. 
124 Press Release, 106/2000 CARlCOM Response to G7 Charges (Aug. 11, 2000), at 
http://www2.carib-export.com. 
125 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 70, §102 cmt. d (citing Norwegian Fisheries 
Case). 
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have become binding customary law and that the 25 Criteria are en-
forceable indirectly, insofar as they reflect the obligations of the Forty. 
Without going into an exhaustive analysis of the customary value of 
the Forty Recommendations,126 several strong foundations upon 
which such a claim might rest can be identified. Although in 1993 
Bruce Zagaris described the Forty Recommendations as "soft law," he 
went on to say that, "[a]lthough soft laws are not immediately bind-
ing, they are usually precursors to hard law. "127 Since then, the inter-
national acceptance that the Forty Recommendations enjoy has 
broadened substantially. Counting only the members of the FATF, the 
Council of Europe, the CFATF, the APG, and the ESAAMLG, over one 
hundred countries have committed to the implementation of the 
Forty Recommendations. While the majority of these are not FATF 
members, they still have effected legislation and policy changes to 
bring the Recommendations into effect. Some have even agreed to 
mutual evaluation to assess their progress in the implementation.128 
All of these factors are evidence that there is an obligation to comply 
with the Forty Recommendations. 
The extent of international support for the Forty Recommenda-
tions would warrant one of the following conclusions: (1) they have 
become part of customary international law through broad accep-
tance by the dominant nations and acquiescence by the rest; (2) they 
have become particular customary law for the countries that have 
committed to them; or (3) the countries that have made unilateral 
declarations accepting the Forty Recommendations would be es-
topped from claiming they are not bound by those Recommenda-
tions. If they are general customary law, the Forty are binding upon 
all nations. If they are particular customary international law, they still 
would be binding upon the majority of the countries identified as 
non-cooperative, i.e., all except the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and 
Niue. 
126 The focus of this examination is the legal force of the 25 Criteria, not the Forty 
Recommendations. Because of the discrepancies between the Forty and the 25, explored 
below, a more thorough analysis of the existence of legal obligations to the Forty Recom-
mendations is not necessary. 
127 Zagaris & Castilla, supm note 82, at 879. 
128 See CFATF, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supm note 97. 
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B. OECD's 4 Criteria 
As with the FATF initiative, for the OECD membersI29 to have 
sanctions available against Tax Haven Countries, these OFCs must be 
bound by an obligation, either by Consent, or Consensus, not to vio-
late the 4 Criteria. 
1. Consent 
Any attempt to claim that the Object States have accepted the 4 
Criteria, in and of themselves, as binding obligations suffers the same 
frailties as the FATF's 25 Criteria. None of the OFCs identified by the 
report is a member of the OECD,I30 and none of those countries has 
expressed consent to these 4 Criteria in a forum outside the OECD.I3I 
As with the FATF initiative, the Caribbean Community specifically has 
criticized the implementation of these 4 Criteria based on the fact 
that they were set unilaterally by OECD members and the fact that 
Caribbean OFCs had no input in their creation.132 Admittedly, six 
OFCs have expressed such consent and might be legally bound-or 
estopped from complaint-by the 4 Criteria, but this result would not 
impact their applicability to the thirty-five Tax Haven Countries that 
have not accepted them. 
Even beyond the problem of lack of consent, it is hard to accept 
that the Tax Haven Guidelines were intended to be legally enforce-
able generally, let alone against OFCs. Support comes from a sepa-
rate, but related, OECD publication which focuses on bank secrecy.I33 
The preface of this report concludes that the OECD members have 
"agreed to use this Report, whose proposed measures are not in any 
way binding as is the case with all OECD proposals in the tax area, as a ba-
sis for an on-going dialogue."134 Though the 1998 OECD Harmful Tax 
129 The initiative is not limited to the member countries, but for the sake of simplicity, 
I only consider the rights of member states. 
130 See supra notes 21-23. 
131 According to the June report, jurisdictions were "asked to submit information per-
tinent to the application of the tax haven criteria in the context of their facts and circum-
stances ... [And] the full participation of each jurisdiction was invited and encouraged." 
OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note IS, at 10 1: 8. It could be argued 
that the Tax Haven Countries have implicitly accepted the 4 Criteria by such participation. 
However, since the report fails to indicate which jurisdictions, if any, participated, it is im-
possible to explore the possibility of such implicit consent. 
132 See Press Release, 106/2000 CARlCOM Response to G7 Charges, supra note 124. 
133 OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, Mar. 24, 
2000. 
134 [d. at 4 (emphasis added). 
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Competition Report does not expressly declare that its recommenda-
tions are non-binding, it does imply, in its instructions to the CFA, a 
belief that they are not. First, it instructs the CFA to develop a dia-
logue with non-members.135 Second, it instructs the CFA to "encour-
age [non-members] to associate themselves with the recommenda-
tions set out in the Report. "136 Finally, the Report describes the 
endorsement of the Guidelines as a "clear political message. "137 These 
statements seem to imply that the OECD believed there was, at that 
time, no existent obligation for non-member states to comply with the 
recommendations. 
Furthermore, the report admits that the guidelines on preferen-
tial tax regimes in member states are not binding upon non-member 
states.138 If the report were binding on non-members but not on 
members, there would be a double standard, thereby giving credence 
to the argument that the Tax Haven Guidelines are indeed unilater-
ally imposed standards that should have no actual legal impact. 
2. Coincidence 
The Tax Haven Criteria do not enjoy the same odds for coinci-
dental enforceability as the 25 Criteria do. There is little support for 
the OECD from parallel fiscal agreements and none of the Object 
States has made any unilateral declarations. Aside from the agree-
ments promulgated in Europe, there are no conventions which could 
demonstrate broad acceptance of the principles contained in the 4 
Criteria, and since none of the OFCs are signatories to these instru-
ments, there is no basis for Subject States to argue that the Object 
States are bound by parallel obligations. 
However, the OECD has promulgated two relevant Model Tax 
Conventions: the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters (Model Convention on Assistance in Tax Matters) 139 and 
the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (Model Tax Con-
vention).14o Although these conventions are not binding agreements, 
the Model Tax Convention, due to its broad acceptance, can be ana-
lyzed for insights into the general state practice in fiscal matters. 
135 OECD Report. supra note 12, at 5411 143. 
136 Id. at 66. 
137 Id. at 381[ 90. 
138 Id. at 53 11 140. 
139 OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, opened 10 
signalureJan. 25, 1988, Europ. T.S. No. 127, 271.L.M. 1160 (1988). 
140 OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (1992). 
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3. Consensus 
It is very difficult to argue the existence of any customary obliga-
tions in the area of taxes; there is simply no broad consensus. The 
only state practice concerning international taxation is almost always 
restricted to intricate and heavily negotiated bilateral treaties; success 
in building consensus is limited to the broad acceptance of the Model 
Tax Convention. This is very different from the FATF initiative, which 
was born from a ten-year-old, broadly accepted effort; the OECD ini-
tiative appears from a void in relevant customary and treaty law. The 
fact that OECD countries offer termination of treaties as a sanction 
further demonstrates that they feel no obligations exist outside the 
treaty framework. 
There is very little evidence of consensus in tax matters outside 
the area of double taxation, and efforts to form consensus with regard 
to mutual legal assistance (MIA) have proven largely unsuccessful. 
Generally, MIA instruments specifically exclude criminal tax mat-
ters.141 The most progress in the area of multilateral cooperation in 
tax matters has occurred in Europe. Under the 1978 Additional Pro-
tocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, members of the Council of Europe abandoned their discre-
tion to refuse assistance in relation to fiscal matters.142 Thirty-one 
states have ratified this protocol. Of the five Council of Europe states 
that were at risk of being identified as tax havens, Andorra, Cyprus, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, and San Marino, only Cyprus has ratified this 
protocol. Cyprus, Malta, and San Marino all have made an advance 
commitment to comply with the 1998 OECD Report. Only Liechten-
stein and Andorra have no obligations.143 The various successes within 
the EU and among its members are relevant only on a regional 
level,l44 They enjoy no application outside Europe, and none of the 
Object States is a member. 
141 See Bill Gilmore, Money Laundering and International Tax Cooperation: ExpWring the In-
terface, in TAX COMPETITION: BROADENING THE DEBATE 26, 35 (Eur. Fin. F. 2000). 
142 COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, OECD, TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN 
OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES 10-11 'II 6 (Feb, 22, 1994). 
143 See Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, Mar. 17, 1978, at http://conventions.coe.intjtreaty/EN/ cadreprinci-
pal.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2001). 
144 To deal with non-criminal tax matters, the Council of the European Communities 
issued Directive 77/799/CEE. Though originally limited to the field of di1'ect taxation, this 
Directive has expanded to include administrative assistance in matters related to direct 
and indirect taxation. The Nordic Countries have further implemented regionally the 
Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, which has been in force since 
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Attempts to extend such a uniform approach to legal assistance 
in tax matters outside Europe have not been as successful. In 1988, 
the OECD, together with the Council of Europe, drafted the Multilat-
eral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Mat-
ters.145 This convention has not been broadly accepted. While it has 
finally come into force seven years after it opened for signature, it has 
been ratified by only eight countries.146 
III. USING THE CRITERIA TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
The use of sanctions by OECD or FATF members for the breach 
of the principles contained in the 4 and 25 Criteria can be defended 
under two potential rationales. First, the criteria themselves can con-
tain legally binding principles, and measures taken to remedy a 
breach of those principles therefore would be precluded from wrong-
fulness. Second, OFCs are prevented from complaining of the imposi-
tion of countermeasures for non-compliance with the criteria, either 
by parallel obligations or unilateral declarations, which indicate con-
sent, or by customary obligations. 
Because neither group of criteria is inherently obligatory, the 
category of Consent, as here defined, is not a viable source of obliga-
tion for the Object States.147 We are left, therefore, to analyze the ex-
tent to which those criteria operate as a means of assessing compli-
ance with other obligations, whether existing by Consensus or created 
by Coincidence. 
It is important to note that, whether the obligations are estoppel 
or legal obligations, the result is the same: OFCs would be precluded 
from complaining about the imposition of sanctions. Therefore, the 
distinction between obligations which might be incurred by unilateral 
declaration-and so, enforceable by estoppel-and obligations in-
1991. See generally COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS. OECD. TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
BETWEEN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 142, 
at 11 et seq. 
145 [d. at 11 1. 7. 
146 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the US. 
See Convention on Mutyual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Jan. 25, 1988, at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). 
147 See supra notes 95-97. The criteria are not binding either by consent or consensus, 
but the category of Consensus is stilI viable because of the possibility of parallel customary 
obligations. 
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curred by parallel agreement or consensus-and so, enforceable by 
law-is not relevant. Because of these factors, it is beneficial to deal 
with all of the obligations simultaneously in order to assess to what 
extent there is an overlap with the criteria. 
Furthermore, because there is a multiplicity of criteria in each 
initiative, and because there is no formula for determining which of 
those criteria determine the inclusion of a jurisdiction on the list(s), 
demonstrating an absence of a state's obligation to comply with any of 
the criteria throws the entire categorization into question. 
B. 25 Criteria and Coinciding Obligations 
It is most efficient to identifY the obligations and the relevant 25 
Criteria the FATF have promulgated under the four categories that 
the FATF established: (1) loopholes in financial regulations; (2) im-
pediments set by other regulatory requirements; (3) obstacles to in-
ternational cooperation; and (4) inadequate resources for preventing, 
detecting, and repressing money laundering activities. In this manner, 
one can identifY which, if any, obligations coincide with the 25 Crite-
ria which the FATF claims assess compliance with international stan-
dards, and identifY which criteria cannot stand on this claim. 
If we, for the sake of argument, presume coincidence between 
these obligations and the 25 Criteria, the problem still remains, how-
ever, for the Cook and Marshall Islands, Niue, and Nauru which are 
not signatories to any of those agreements.148 Furthermore, if we fo-
cus only on those countries bound by one or more of the above in-
struments, there are still a number of points on which the 25 Criteria 
have no support. 
1. Loopholes in Financial Regulations 
Of the four, this category enjoys the most support from a variety 
of parallel instruments: the UN Convention, OAS Model Regulations, 
CFATF Nineteen Recommendations, the Council of Europe Initiative, 
and the Forty Recommendations. Regardless, aspects of some of the 
criteria in this category have no support from any of these instru-
ments. 
Criterion 1 speaks of adequate regulation of financial institu-
tions, whether onshore or offshore. Recommendation 26, which cov-
148 The Cook Islands are observers to the APG. But as described supra notes 113-114 
this is not strictly speaking a binding obligation, and is certainly not for observers. 
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ers the same concerns, makes no comment concerning financial insti-
tutions offshore. Criterion 7, which deals with obstacles to access to 
information by administrative and judicial authorities, exceeds Rec-
ommendation 12 by including information concerning the beneficial 
owner(s). Admittedly, Recommendation 11 requires the acquisition of 
information concerning the "true identity of the persons on whose 
behalf an account is opened ... if there are any doubts as to whether 
these clients or customers are acting on their own behalf. "149 Criterion 
7, however, shifts the burden even further by requiring financial insti-
tutions to "identifY the beneficial owners when the identification of 
the account-holder is not sufficiently established. "150 
Furthermore, neither regulation of offshore institutions nor the 
identification of beneficial owners is mentioned by the UN Conven-
tion, OAS Model Regulations, or the CFATF Nineteen Recommenda-
tions. Eight of the eleven Sample Object States have been identified as 
meeting Criterion 1. Five States meet, and the Cayman Islands par-
tially meets, Criterion 7. 
2. Weaknesses in Commercial Requirements Including the 
Identification of Beneficial Ownership and the Registration 
Procedures of Business Entities 
Criteria 13 and 14 and the accompanying comments continue 
the 25 Criteria's overbreadth concerning beneficial ownership by 
shifting the focus onto the identification of beneficial owners of legal 
and business entities. These criteria claim to derive from Recommen-
dations 9 and 25. Although number 25 warns of the potential for 
abuse of shell corporations, it does not recommend any particular 
means to address this problem. Specifically, it does not suggest ad-
dressing it in terms of customer identification nor does it expressly 
mention the concept of beneficial ownership. Recommendation 9, 
which does address customer identification, addresses it in the con-
text of "financial activities as a commercial undertaking by businesses 
or professions which are not financial institutions." These recom-
mendations do not make clear the relationship between the 
identification of customers of non-financial institutions, and the abuse 
of shell companies. Moreover, the language of both recommendations 
is even weaker than that of others. Recommendation 9 says that the 
149 FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, sujJTa note 43, Recommendation 11. 
150 FATF, REpORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 
3 n.7. 
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national authorities "should consider applying" the customer 
identification policies for non-financial institutions, while Recom-
mendation 25 says that countries should "take notice of the potential 
for abuse." These factors make it hard to see Criteria 13 and 14 as 
simply assessing the obligations under the recommendations. I51 
Furthermore, the identity of the beneficial owners of business 
entities is not mentioned by the UN Convention, OAS Model Regula-
tions,152 or the CFATF Nineteen Recommendations. Six of the eleven 
Sample Object States are denoted as meeting Criterion 13 and seven 
as meeting 14.153 Altogether, ten of the eleven countries are found to 
meet one of these criteria, which are not fully covered by the recom-
mendations or the other sources of obligation. 
3. Obstacles to International Cooperation Regarding Both 
Administrative and Judicial Levels 
Criterion 18 stresses the use of the fiscal exception to restrict the 
level of cooperation between supervisory authorities. The fiscal ex-
ception is the name given to the refusal of cooperation on the 
grounds that such transactions may relate to tax matters. 
The comment to Recommendation 15 expresses similar concern 
for the removal of the fiscal exception. However, this comment was 
only adopted on July 2, 1999. Consequently, it meets the same obsta-
cles as the 25 Criteria for being promulgated after the Object States 
endorsed the Forty Recommelldations,154 It has not been explicitly 
endorsed by those states. 
Seven of the Sample Object States have been identified as violat-
ing Criterion 18.155 Four of the OAS membersI56 have been assessed as 
violating Criterion 18, despite the fact that the OAS Model Regula-
151 Even if we presume that the customer identification obligations were intended to 
apply to shell companies, they still meet the same obstacles thal were described concerning 
Criterion 7. 
152 All five relevant members of the OAS have been cited for some violation, but the 
OAS Model makes no reference to the identification of legal or business entities outside 
the context of the obligations of financial institutions keeping records of clients' identities. 
153 Liechtenstein only partially meets this uiterion, so the Council of Europe initiative 
is of little consequence. 
154 See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text. 
155 The seven are the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Liechtenstein, Panama, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
156 The fOllr are the Bahamas, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
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tions, the Nineteen Recommendations, and the UN Convention do 
not call for the elimination of the fiscal exception. 
4. Inadequate Resources for Preventing, Detecting, and Repressing 
Money Laundering Activities 
Of the four, this category eI~oys the least support from parallel 
instruments; it comprises three criteria. The first two, 23 and 24, deal 
with the lack of resources in public and private sectors; the third, 25, 
deals with the absence of a FlU or of an equivalent mechanism. None 
of these criteria is dealt with in the Forty Recommendations. Eight of 
the eleven relevant OFCs are denoted as meeting Criterion 23; two as 
meeting 24; and seven as meeting 25. Altogether, nine of eleven coun-
tries are found to meet one of these criteria, which are not even con-
sidered in the Forty Recommendations. 
Of the parallel sources, only the CFATF's Nineteen Recommen-
dations expressly reference an obligation that adequate resources be 
dedicated to fighting money laundering.l57 Although the OAS Model 
Regulations do recommend that the Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission assist in the procurement of sufficient resources,15S 
this is only a recommendation and has no specific binding nature.159 
Furthermore, while FlUs might be more efficient than traditional 
mechanisms for dealing with money laundering, such mechanisms 
were not considered by the Forty Recommendations. The EGMONT 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which even the FATF identifies 
as a separate initiative, is the only example of an international organi-
zation attempting this specific goal. I60 Of the Sample Object States, 
only Panama is a member of the EGEMONT Group, but since Pan-
ama did not meet Criterion 25, this Group is irrelevant to the inquiry. 
157 CFATF, REVISED CFATF RECOMMENDATIONS, at http://,,,,,w.cfatf.org/eng (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2001). It is interesting to note, however, that Recommendation 19 goes further 
to say that countries with insufficient resources ought to receive aid from other countries. 
Seeid. 
158 MODEL REGULATIONS CONCERNING LAUNDERING OFFENSES CONNECTED TO ILLICIT 
DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER SERIOUS OFFENSES, Recommendation no. 3, at http:/ / 
"ww.ckad.oas.org/ en/legal_deveiopment/legal-regulations-money.htm (Oct. 1998). 
159 See id. at Recommendation no. 1. 
If>() See FATF, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING INITIATIVES, at 
http://www.oecd.org./fatf/Initiatives_en.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001). 
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C. 4 Criteria 
OECD identifies these four criteria: (1) no or only nominal taxes; 
(2) lack of transparency; (3) no substantial activities; and (4) lack of 
effective exchange of information. Because there is sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that neither the first nor fourth criterion can 
stand, I will elaborate upon the enforceability of only these two. With 
each of these criterion, we encounter two central problems. First, 
even to the extent there might be identifiable obligations under ei-
ther Consensus or Coincidence, the expectations of the OECD ex-
ceed those identifiable limits. Second, the OECD members do not 
meet the criteria they attempt to impose on other states and therefore 
should be precluded from enforcing them. 
1. No or Only Nominal Taxes 
Of the sources identified above, aside from the 4 Criteria, only 
the European Code of Conduct attempts to impose an obligation to 
limit, or rather, raise, tax levels. Since none of the Object States is a 
party to this initiative, none has expressed an intent to be bound. Nei-
ther have the Object States expressed any awareness of a prior obliga-
tion. 
This criterion is concerned with minimizing "tax induced distor-
tions" that derive from the disparities in tax costs between jurisdic-
tions.161 The degree of incentive to shift income from one jurisdiction 
to another is directly related to the difference between their respec-
tive tax levels. There would be as much incentive to shift income from 
Sweden to the US, with a tax disparity approaching 30%, as there is to 
shift from the US to one of the Object States, where the tax disparity 
would also be about 30%.162 In this sense, OECD members demand 
from Object States more than they demand from each other. 
2. Lack of Effective Exchange of Information 
This criterion has a possible overlap with FATF's 25 Criteria and 
might, therefore, attempt to borrow any legal strength from that 
source. Under this title, the OECD specifically discusses issues con-
cerning secrecy and customer identification, both of which the FATF 
161 SeeOECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 15, at 22,29. 
162 See Gabriel Stein, Economics and Tax Harmonisation, in TAX COMPETITION: BROADEN-
ING THE DEBATE, supra note 141, at 1,1 (citing OEeD statistics). 
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identifies under the title Loopholes in Financial Regulations. I63 Any 
overlap that might exist here should be bypassed by the fiscal excuse. 
To the extent that the Forty Recommendations are hard law, the fiscal 
excuse could be seen as obviated.l64 But the elimination of this excuse 
would be largely ineffectual for tax authorities because the use of in-
formation, even under the Forty Recommendations, is limited to the 
enforcement of money laundering crimes. It has no impact on the use 
of information for tax matters except to the extent that participants 
have added tax crimes to their lists of "serious offences." 
Furthermore, the OECD denies Object States the option to apply 
traditional principles that limit international cooperation such as 
reciprocity, but it allows its members the discretion to determine 
whether they will participate, and to what extent, in any exchange of 
information. Perhaps the most obvious example comes from Switzer-
land, which has an express reservation on the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention Article on the exchange of information. I65 A more startling 
example, however, comes from Britain. As the Commentary to the 
Model Tax Convention explains: 
The United Kingdom takes the view that the Article imposes 
no obligation on it to carry out enquiries on behalf of a Con-
tracting State in cases where no liability to United Kingdom 
tax is at issue, since to carry out such enquiries would be 
contrary to its laws and administrative practice. I66 
Unless there is a separate claim under English or Scottish revenue law, 
a UK court will decline jurisdiction over a suit to enforce the revenue 
163 The former coincides with Section A(iv): Excessive secrecy provisions regarding 
financial institutions, Criteria 8 and 9; Section A(iii): Inadequate customer identification 
requirements for financial institutions, Criteria 4-7. See FATF, REpORT OF THE FATF ON 
NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, Annex, Criteria Defining 
Non-<'ooperative Countries or Territories, at 10. There is also the possibility that the 
OECD's concern about customer identification could coincide with the FATF's concern 
about beneficial ownership which is first discussed in the context of the owners of financial 
institutions and the customers of such institutions, also under LoojJholes in Financial Reguw-
lions, (Criteria 2, 3, 5, and 7), and then later discussed in the context of ownership of busi-
ness and legal entities, under the title of Obstacles Raised by Other Regulatory Requirements. 
(Criteria 13 and 14.) The concept of beneficial ownership is prevalent in the area of tax 
enforcement. However, the OECD does not expressly describe it as a concern, nor does 
the 2000 Report mention the concept, so there is no reason to impute this concern to the 
OECD Criteria. 
164 Ignoring the late date of the adoption of Comment to Article 15. 
165 OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL art. 26 & Commentary 
(Reservations) 'll 24(1992). 
166 [d. art. 26 & Commentary (Observations) 'll 22. 
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law of another country167 and will refuse to enforce a ruling of a for-
eign court concerning that forum's revenue law.168 This policy runs 
exactly counter to the principle described in the report stating, 
"Harmful tax competition which leads to tax evasion by tax payers of 
other countries may be encouraged if one country will not enforce 
the tax claims of another country. "169 
The OECD further expects OFCs to abandon the principle of 
reciprocity as a basis to refuse cooperation. For example, the report 
says that it is not sufficient for an OFC to exchange information con-
cerning criminal tax matters related to other crimes or concerning 
tax fraud if that jurisdiction does not assist with collecting informa-
tion concerning tax avoidance.170 Implicit in this statement is the ex-
pectation that an OFC must supply information on tax avoidance 
even where that OFC might not collect the tax in question or even 
consider avoidance a crime. Such is the case for the Cayman Islands, 
which collects neither corporate nor personal income tax.I7I 
This premise runs counter to the principle of reciprocity. Accord-
ing to the OECD's own Model Tax Convention, "[t]he exchange of 
information can take place only insofar as the tax concerned is cov-
ered by the Convention."172 Consequently, where a state has no in-
come tax, treaties with that state might not include the exchange of 
income tax information. In the words of one of the OECD's own re-
ports: 
Under legal reciprocity the requested State is under no obli-
gation to carry out administrative measures that are not 
permitted under its own laws and practice or to supply items 
of information that are not obtainable in the normal course 
of its administration.... [Legal reciprocity] establishes a 
kind of 'minimum position' whereby the requested State is 
obliged to give no more assistance than that which the re-
questing State is capable of providing at the national level; 
167 Government ofIndia v. Taylor, 1955 A.C. 491, 1 All ER 292 (H.L. 1955). 
HiS Attorney-General for Canada v. William Schulze & Co., [1901] 9 Scots L. T. Reps. 4 
(Outer House). 
169 OECD Report, supra note 12, at 51 ,. 136. 
170 See id. at 24 i 54. 
171 Stein, supra note 162, at 10. 
172 COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, OEeD, TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN 
OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 142, at 18 i 22. 
Note that the US has expressed the view that the Article should apply to all taxes imposed 
by a Contracting State, not only taxes covered by the Convention. 
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moreover, the requested State need supply no more than is 
obtainable under the normal practice for that State. This 
does not mean that a more extensive assistance is excluded, 
but that the requested State need not comply with the re-
quest. 173 
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Even the further reaching OECD MIA Model provides for limits by 
domestic law according to principles oflegal reciprocity.l74 
Even within the EU, a region that enjoys relatively harmonized 
tax policies, member states have no obligation to offer assistance 
where it would be contrary to their present domestic laws. Of twelve 
EU countries surveyed-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom-all twelve said their tax authorities are limited when 
the information is not available under national law or domestic law 
and when administrative practices prevent inquiries being carried out 
to provide the information, or prevent the collection and use of such 
information)75 Eleven of the twelve participants were required to ref-
use exchanging information when to do so would be contrary to pub-
lic policy. Only Denmark was not so restrained. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the FATF nor the OECD enjoy firm legal grounds to 
claim that sanctions would be available against states that refuse to co-
operate with their respective initiatives. 
Admittedly, the FATF is on better footing than the OECD, but it 
is far from sure footing. Since the 25 Criteria are not themselves bind-
ing, the obstacles come from the disparities between actual binding 
obligations and the expectations within the 25 Criteria. The first ob-
stacle is the fact that some of the Object States, such as the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, and Niue, have not bound themselves to any of the 
parallel instruments. Ignoring this obstacle, the parallel obligations 
that do exist do not support all of the criteria. Even the Forty Rec-
ommendations, which are themselves a dubious source of binding 
173Id. at 26" 47-48. 
m See OEeD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, sujJra 
note 139, Preamble. 
175 United Kingdom Inland Revenue, Exchange of Information on Direct Taxation lorithin 
the European Union, Appendix I, Mutual Assistance in the Field of Direct Taxation: a Coordinated 
Audit by 12 Supreme Audit Institutions of Member States of the European Union (Nov. 5 1997), at 
17-18 tbl. 6. 
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obligations, do not support all of the demands that the 25 Criteria 
make. Consequently, it would be a difficult task for the FATF members 
to argue any use of sanctions is legal. 
The same task for OECD members, on the other hand, would be 
Herculean. There is no identifiable source under which Object States 
could be said to be bound to comply with the expectations of the 4 
Criteria, whether Consent, Coincidence, or Consensus. Furthermore, 
even the OECD members do not meet those same expectations and 
therefore should be precluded from attempting to enforce them, 
even if there were some obligation for the Object States. 
Subject States should take heart in two factors: (1) to the extent 
that the measures they implement do not constitute sanctions under 
international law, they are not precluded; and (2) there is still room 
for further negotiation on the subjects of money laundering and 
harmful tax competition. Unfriendly acts that do not amount to sanc-
tions would be deemed acts of retorsion and are not prohibited under 
international law.176 Furthermore, most OFCs have indicated only 
support for the international anti-money laundering efforts. In fact, 
the Caribbean Community, while criticizing the G7, reaffirmed its po-
sition against money laundering,l77 There is even hope in the struggle 
against harmful tax competition since strong arguments can be made 
that such competition is harmful to OFCs in addition to OECD mem-
ber states.178 But there is still a long way to go before a comprehensive 
system of international legal obligations will bind OFCs and others 
alike. 
176 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 70, § 905. 
177 CARICOM, STATEMENT ON OECD HARMFUL TAX POLICY (July 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.caricom.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). 
178 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Wel-
fareState, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1665 (2000). 
